Monday, 19 August 2013

The Financial Transactions Tax (part 1)

For the past three weeks, I have been researching the evolution of the FTT debate since the Commission initiated the proposals in 2010.

Two puzzles guide my research. 

The first puzzle is the reason I got into researching the FTT - the link to shadow banking. Since the European Commission (EC) published its draft Directive in February 2013, met with a sense of disbelief from various quarters, the resistance to the FTT has concentrated around the repo market, a market crucial to shadow banking activities, in particular collateral intermediation. Take for example the Goldman Sachs (2013) Report on the European Financial Transactions Tax:


…the bulk of the FTT impact stems from the European banks’ REPO books (€118 bn)
followed by derivatives (€32 bn), equities (€11 bn) and government bond books (€4 bn)


The FTT has brought repo out of the shadows. How? By being very ambitious, to me yet unprecedented in scope and reach. The EC calls it the AAA framework: all markets, all instruments, all actors. And they mean it.   In targeting both organized markets and over-the counter-transactions across all traded instruments, the FTT is broader in scope than the 2012 French and 2013 Italian FTT on equity (and equity derivatives in Italy), than the 1990s Swedish FTT on equity and fixed-income instruments, and the Tobin tax on currency transactions that served as the theoretical foundation for FTT initiatives. It combines a ‘residence principle’, if a party in a transaction is resident of an implementing Member State, with an ‘issuance principle’, that applies the FTT to transactions with instruments issued in the Member States, regardless of where that transaction is taking place. This intended extra-territorial effect would be supported by an ‘ownership principle’, in that the issuers would only recognize the legal ownership once the FTT is paid.

Forget about the tax revenue narrative - this matters, and may turn out to be a stumbling block - it's useful to shore up the legitimacy of the FTT. There is something more important at play. The FTT, in its current form, seeks to engineer a shift in business models in finance, and in particular to bring out of the shadow, and make more expensive, activities that the BIS/US FED/FSB have associated with systemic risk. The European FTT can be read as a deliberate attempt from the Commission to re-organize the European financial sector in a manner far more radical than the numerous regulatory initiatives at either European or global level, or indeed the national FTTs implemented by France or Italy since the crisis. 



What makes the FTT radical? Unlike previous proposals, the AAA framework - all instruments, all markets, all actors - affects shadow banking activities, and the interconnectedness these generate across markets and institutions.  This is crucial to understand how opposition to the proposals concentrated around the taxation of the repo market, a market that somehow manages to be both systemic and largely invisible (in the shadows) in European finance. Pension funds, repo lobbies, transnational banks, governments and the European Central Bank have all rallied to its defense. 

So, to understand the trajectory of the European FTT, it is useful to look at it through the lens of interconnectedness. Network approaches are the next big think in analysis of systemic risk/macroprudential policies/'too interconnected to fail' debates. Applied to the European FTT, they can also reveal the political economy dimension of the governance of systemic risk.

But interconnectedness cannot explain the other big puzzle of the European FTT. Contrary to similar processes in the field of financial governance, where initial ambitions get watered down through the interventions of various stakeholders, the EC’s proposals became more radical in the three year process that culminated in February 2013 with the publication of the draft Directive. This trajectory flies in the face of various streams of European scholarship that typically see the Commission as a conservative institution - on austerity or on global initiatives to tighten banking regulation; engaged in turf wars with other European institutions - while in the FTT, the EC adopted the proposals of the European Parliament on extrateritorriality. 



How come that the European FTT proposals became increasingly more radical throughout the various stages of consultation and re-drafting of the institutionally pragmatic DG Tax? And how did the repo market - that is, a shadow banking activity par excellence - turn to be central to contestations of the FTT, a market that is at once systemic and with minimal regulatory oversight? More on this in the next posts.


Thursday, 6 June 2013

Being wrong pays for the IMF - on Greece and elsewhere

Strange mea culpa from the IMF on Greece.

On the one hand, it admits that it was over-optimistic in its assessments of the impact that fiscal tightening would have on growth/public debt sustainability etc. On the other hand, Wall Street Journal reports, the lessons learned would lead them to take a tougher stance in future bailouts.

Sounds like a contradiction? Yes, it is. It's also indicative of the way that IMF has designed and implemented conditionality wherever it goes: always too optimistic. Pawel Morski, on Twitter, unearthed a couple of similar quotes for Asia and Argentina. I found the same for IMF programs in Eastern Europe during 2009-2010 (Romania, Hungary, Latvia). We can go back even further: the IMF's own Independent Evaluation Office 2003 report on Fiscal Adjustment in IMF supported programs:

Overoptimism about fiscal adjustment is partly caused by overoptimism about growth projections. 
Absolute levels of revenue respond to growth with shortfalls in growth leading to corresponding shortfalls in revenue. However, absolute levels of expenditures, projected on the basis of optimistic growth forecasts, do not fall when growth falls below expectations, leading to an increase in expenditure ratios.  (p.13)


Let's put aside the fact that austerity has a very poor record, as Mark Blyth so thorougly documented in his last book and turn to the more mundane question of too-optimist forecasts.

Forecasting errors are to be expected in a crisis when uncertainty prevails and conditionality is applied. Hardly fair to fault the IMF for that. Yet the question remains, how come the IMF is always too optimistic? Because it doesnt want to scare markets, is the typical answer. But that, in my opinion, ignores an important angle of the politics of the IMF's crisis interventions. The IMF does not negotiate with markets over austerity, but with governments.

Growth forecasts are central to fiscal conditionality. The IMF sets fiscal targets as budget deficits to GDP ratios. For example, the Greek deficit target for 2012 was 6.6% of GDP.  The choice that the IMF makes about being optimistic or pessimistic about its forecasts is a political choice. Consider again the quote from above: absolute levels of revenue fall with the lower growth, whereas absolute levels of expenditure dont. The numerator  (budget deficit) gets bigger. If the IMF chooses to be optimistic about future Greek growth, then the actual denominator will be smaller. The budget deficit to GDP ratio becomes much bigger than its target. To meet the target, the Greek government has to choices: cut more or re-negotiate targets with the IMF. 

So, it's not that the IMF somehow magically recruits optimistic people. It's rather that optimistic growth forecasts strengthen the IMF’s leverage in negotiations. Think about Greece: governments have to go back, hat in hand, to the negotiating table in order to persuade the IMF that its political survival depends on slightly less draconic targets. Being wrong pays for the IMF, as long as its being optimistically wrong.