Research on the political economy of shadow banking, a fast growing area, typically explore the regulatory angle to explain shadow banking as regulatory arbitrage. What this type of argument does not take into account is a important, new phenomenon of shadow intermediation: interconnectedness generated through repo markets. Rather than tracing institutions
crossing porous regulatory perimeters, analytical efforts would be
better placed to theorize collateral networks, the institutions that act
as key nodes in those networks, and the common exposure they generate. The collateral intensive nature of shadow banking underpins two mechanisms of interconnectedness: the risk management
framework and the re-use/re-hypothecation channel. Both have systemic
implications, together generating an important political conflict for
the management of shadow banking because private leverage is born in,
and can destabilize, government debt markets. Collateral-intensive
finance thus confronts central banks and governments with a deeply
political question: what governance arrangement is best suited to manage
the systemic risks generated through shadow activities that blur the
lines between financial stability policy and fiscal policy?
Institutional innovations that ensure coordination between the central
bank and government work best to manage ‘shadow’ interconnectedness.
The full paper here.
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